Valuing health outcomes : developing better defaults based on health opportunity costs by Ochalek, Jessica et al.
This is a repository copy of Valuing health outcomes : developing better defaults based on 
health opportunity costs.




Ochalek, Jessica orcid.org/0000-0003-0744-1178, Claxton, Karl orcid.org/0000-0003-
2002-4694, Lomas, James orcid.org/0000-0002-2478-7018 et al. (1 more author) (2020) 
Valuing health outcomes : developing better defaults based on health opportunity costs. 





This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ierp20
Expert Review of Pharmacoeconomics & Outcomes
Research
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ierp20
Valuing health outcomes: developing better
defaults based on health opportunity costs
Jessica Ochalek , Karl Claxton , James Lomas & Kimberly M. Thompson
To cite this article: Jessica Ochalek , Karl Claxton , James Lomas & Kimberly M.
Thompson (2020): Valuing health outcomes: developing better defaults based on health
opportunity costs, Expert Review of Pharmacoeconomics & Outcomes Research, DOI:
10.1080/14737167.2020.1812387
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/14737167.2020.1812387
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 20 Sep 2020.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 3
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
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ABSTRACT
Background: Current health economic analysis guidelines emphasize the importance of using nation-
ally appropriate cost and valuation inputs. However, some countries lack national data, and some 
analyses focus on interventions with costs and benefits at regional or global scales.
Methods: Recognizing the need for better estimates of appropriate values for application at these 
levels than those used in the past, we characterize population-weighted dollar per disability-adjusted 
life year (DALY) averted by World Bank Income Level based on available national estimates of the 
marginal productivity of the healthcare system.
Results: The defaults suggested here reflect health opportunity costs across countries more consistent 
with existing evidence than those previously used or recommended. As countries change income levels 
and healthcare spending, and as additional or updated marginal productivity of healthcare expenditure 
estimates become available, we expect the defaults to change.
Conclusion: The best option for informing decisions around resource allocation in health care such that 
they improve health outcomes overall remains the use of time-appropriate country-specific estimates of 
the marginal productivity of the healthcare system. Instead of single, time-invariant defaults, health 
economists should seek to develop valuation inputs that better account for health opportunity costs 
and do so over time.
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The results of health economic analyses (HEAs) increasingly 
help to inform decisions and recommendations around 
resource allocation in healthcare [1–5   ], although considerable 
variability exists in the practice of HEAs, both in the methods 
applied and the assumptions used, all of which can affect 
results [6–8 ]. Decisions made by individual healthcare systems 
include, whether to use public funds to support a healthcare 
intervention, negotiations around the price of new healthcare 
intervention seeking to enter the national market, and the 
priorities for public funding of healthcare interventions as 
part of a package of care (e.g., Health Benefits Package) 
given the fixed or limited resources available. The results of 
HEAs can also inform decisions and recommendations made 
across healthcare systems. For example, the Disease Control 
Priorities Network’s essential universal health coverage model 
benefits package, which offers a generic starting point for low- 
and middle-income countries to begin to develop their own 
country-specific health benefits packages [9]. The World Bank 
also categorizes countries into four World Bank Income Levels 
(WBILs) that it uses for its investment decisions based on gross 
national income (GNI)1 per capita [10]. For the 2020 fiscal year, 
the World Bank classification includes 31 low-income (LI) 
countries based on GNI per capita of 1,025 USD or less, 47 
lower-middle-income (LMI) countries with GNI per capita 1,026 
USD to 3,995 USD, 60 upper-middle-income (UMI) countries 
with GNI per capita 3,996 USD to 12,375 USD, and 80 high- 
income (HI) countries with GNI per capita 12,376 USD or 
above [10].
In their decisions and recommendations, policymakers con-
sider value for money, often judged by comparing the addi-
tional costs and benefits of a healthcare intervention against 
a threshold value. For example, for cost-effectiveness analysis, 
policymakers typically compare the ratio of additional costs to 
health benefits in the form of the incremental cost- 
effectiveness ratio (ICER) to a threshold value. In this case, if 
the ICER falls below the threshold, the policymakers deem the 
intervention as a good value for money. Alternatively, the 
threshold may be used to calculate net benefit, which offers 
advantages over comparisons of ICERs to a threshold [11–15   ]. 
For this analysis, we focus on the threshold applied for 
valuation.
In HEAs, the threshold value used serves as an explicit or 
implicit policy choice and may reflect any of a number of 
different concepts. For example, the threshold may reflect 
a supply-side concept (e.g., the marginal productivity of 
healthcare expenditure representing the opportunity cost of 
committing expenditure to a specific intervention in terms of 
health) or a demand-side concept (e.g., societal willingness to 
pay for gains in health), or a concept reflecting a norm without 
any empirical foundation (e.g., multipliers of GDP per capita or 
150 USD per DALY averted benchmark) [16–21  ]. Whether the 
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policy threshold explicitly or implicitly applied in practice 
reflects health opportunity costs or not, making choices 
about interventions inevitably involves valuation [22]. In addi-
tion, how health systems incur health opportunity costs 
depends on financing and delivery and the fixed or flexible 
nature of the budget. Using valuation inputs in health eco-
nomic analyses that do not reflect health opportunity costs 
can lead to decisions that reduce health outcomes overall 
rather than improving them [23].
Empirical estimates of the marginal productivity of the 
healthcare system available for most countries provide 
a means to quantify national health opportunity costs, either 
based on studies conducted using within-country data (i.e. in 
the United Kingdom, Australia, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and South Africa) or cross-country data [24–32     ].
Analysts developed most of these estimates in the last few 
years, and many countries with highly diverse characteristics 
still lack estimates (e.g., Afghanistan, Dominica, Somalia, 
Vanuatu, etc.). Decisions and recommendations made within 
a national healthcare system and those made across health-
care systems frequently rely on defaults.
The historical development and application of default 
thresholds for the evaluation of ICERs and the calculation of 
net benefits for global health interventions continue to 
change. In 1993, the World Bank considered interventions 
with ICERs below 50 USD per DALY averted in LI countries or 
below 150 USD per DALY averted in LMI and UMI countries as 
‘highly cost-effective,’ and interventions with ICERs from 150 
USD-$200 per DALY averted as ‘cost-effective’ [33]. 
Contemporaneous and subsequent CEAs widely adopted 150 
USD per DALY averted as a default without adjustment over 
time [18]. For example, the Disease Control Priority Network 
used these default thresholds to determine cost-effectiveness 
and define national health benefits packages as recently as 
2004, without any consideration for potential growth in these 
values [34].
Another important precedent for other commonly applied 
threshold values to judge ICERs for interventions in LI and LMI 
countries relied on estimates of 1x and 3x GNI per capita as a $ 
per disability-adjusted life year (DALY) [35]. Building on this, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) issued guidelines that 
recommended comparing the incremental dollar per DALY 
averted by an intervention to 1 and 3x gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita as a basis for characterizing an intervention; 
deeming interventions with ICERs below 1x GDP per capita as 
‘highly cost-effective’ and those below 3x GDP per capita as 
‘cost-effective’ [36]. Notably, the 2002 report did not discuss 
the differences between GNI and GDP [37] per capita or note 
the change in metric since it simply asserted that the 2001 
report [35] suggested that ‘interventions costing less than 
three times GDP per capita for each DALY averted represent 
good value for money’ (see page 108) [36]. In 2008, the WHO 
issued guidelines intended to standardize HEAs for immuniza-
tion, which discussed using GNI per capita for threshold ana-
lyses [3737] (see page 63), although elsewhere the report 
suggested analysts might use either GDP or GNI per capita 
(see page 25). These recommendations led to the use of 
valuation thresholds for cost-effectiveness analyses and $ per 
DALY valuation for use in incremental net benefits analyses 
that varied by country and with time as a proportion of GDP 
per capita or GNI per capita [38,39].
The WHO more recently refocused on country-based 
thresholds instead of GDP per capita or GNI per capita-based 
thresholds following discussion of the pros and cons of using 
GDP per capita-based defaults [40]. However, the WHO does 
not provide any guidance for valuation thresholds for coun-
tries that lack national estimates or for the adjustment of the 
thresholds for the time value of money [38]. The most recent 
edition of the Disease Control Priorities (series 3) applies 
a threshold of 200 USD per DALY averted for LI countries 
and 500 USD per DALY averted for LMI countries, based 
loosely on the average of estimates from cross-country data 
falling around 0.5x GDP per capita [9,41], with other analyses 
adopting the 0.5x GDP per capita threshold (e.g., Francke 
et al. [42]).
Recognizing the necessity of defaults, for example, to 
inform decisions for which no country-specific estimate of 
marginal productivity of health care exists or when the 
expected additional costs and benefits estimates exist only 
at a categorical or regional level (e.g., as done to inform 
priority packages of care) [9] or for global health interventions 
(e.g., Global Polio Eradication) [43], we characterize the 
impacts of applying existing defaults and explore the devel-
opment of defaults that better reflect health opportunity 
costs.
2. Methods
We begin by assessing the potential health impact of using 
current defaults instead of country-specific valuation inputs. 
To assess the health impact of using existing defaults (i.e., 150 
USD or 200 USD for LI countries, 500 USD for LMI countries, 
and 0.5x, 1x, and 3x GDP per capita for all WBILs) we calculate 
the health opportunity costs of 1 USD per capita expenditure 
for each country in countries for which an empirical estimate 
of health opportunity cost exists and compare these against 
the implied health opportunity costs from using each default. 
This illustrates the extent to which the default under- or over-
estimates health opportunity costs. We use the empirical esti-
mates of marginal productivity for 23 LI, 34 LMI, 39 UMI, and 
26 HI countries from prior work [29,30] and convert the esti-
mates to 2018 US$ using a US GDP deflator [44]. Thus, with 
200 USD and 500 USD used in DCP3 as the basis for the cost- 
effectiveness of interventions in 2012 US$, we first convert 
these to US$2018 using the same method leading to 221 
USD and 553 USD. We note the continued use of 150 USD 
without adjustment for the time value of money as often 
applied to current year estimates of cost-effectiveness (despite 
the selection of this value over a decade ago) [18]. Given prior 
practice [18,34], we include 150 USD per DALY as a threshold 
for LI countries.
We then suggest and assess alternative defaults that better 
reflect health opportunity costs using the category of WBIL 
[10]. We seek to develop alternative defaults that explicitly 
consider the relative population sizes of countries in each 
group and avoid issues with averaging ratios. To obtain the 
central estimate for each group, we calculate the number of 
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DALYs averted for each country from a hypothetical change in 
expenditure (e.g., 1 USD per capita), sum the DALYs averted 
and hypothetical changes in expenditure, and then divide the 
total hypothetical change in the expenditure by the total of 
the estimates of DALYs averted.2 We report these alternative 
default estimates by the WBIL group in 2018 US$ and then 
express this value as a percentage of group population- 
weighted average GDP per capita to inform alternative default 
estimates.
3. Results
Table 1 reports the results of applying existing defaults to 
judge cost-effectiveness compared to using health opportu-
nity cost-based estimates. Applying a threshold to judge cost- 
effectiveness that is lower than an estimate that reflects the 
marginal productivity of the healthcare system results in over-
estimating health opportunity costs, and this explains the 
inappropriate nature of applying an artificially low and fixed 
threshold. Making decisions on the basis of too low 
a threshold risks not adopting healthcare interventions that 
would generate net health benefits. All other things equal, the 
lower the ICER of any healthcare intervention that is rejected 
on the basis of a default threshold when it would have been 
accepted if the threshold reflected health opportunity costs, 
the greater the potential loss in terms of incremental net 
health benefits forgone.
As shown in Table 1, the application of WBIL-specific fixed 
thresholds shows mixed results when compared to country- 
specific health opportunity cost estimates. Specifically, apply-
ing a threshold of 150 USD results in underestimating health 
opportunity costs for 52% of LI countries and overestimating 
health opportunity costs for the remaining 48%. Applying 
a higher default of 200 USD (or 221 USD in US$2018) across 
LI countries results in underestimating health opportunity 
costs in more countries (70%). For LMI countries, applying 
a 500 USD (or 553 USD in US$2018) default underestimates 
health opportunity costs in 41% of LMI countries.
Consistent with the findings of Woods et al. [23], using GDP 
or GNI per capita as the defaults to judge cost-effectiveness 
generally leads to larger deviations (i.e., under- or overesti-
mates of health opportunity costs) than the fixed and low 
defaults. For example, applying a 3x GDP per capita rule of 
thumb to assess the cost-effectiveness of interventions results 
in an underestimate of health opportunity costs for all coun-
tries, and 1x GDP per capita underestimates health opportu-
nity costs for all LI countries, most LMI (94%) and UMI (87%), 
but fewer HI countries (35%). Making decisions on the basis of 
a threshold that underestimates health opportunity cost risks 
adopting healthcare interventions that displace more health 
than they generate. Applying the more recently suggested 
value of 0.5x GDP per capita (or 0.5x GNI per capita) appears 
to more accurately reflect health opportunity costs for rela-
tively lower-income countries than 1x or 3x GDP per capita. 
However, the number of countries for which using 0.5x GDP or 
0.5x GNI per capita results in an over- or underestimate does 
not distribute equally across income groups. An underesti-
mate of health opportunity costs results in 31% of UMI coun-
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countries. Applying a default of 0.5x GDP per capita to HI 
countries would result in an overestimate of health opportu-
nity costs in all HI countries. These results suggest that a rule 
of 0.5x, 1x, or 3x GDP or GNI per capita will not perform as well 
as using different appropriate income level weighted factors 
for each income level.
Table 2 presents potential alternative defaults based on 
extrapolation of existing marginal productivity of healthcare 
expenditure estimates for population-weighted cost per DALY 
averted by WBIL. These estimates should better reflect health 
opportunity costs for each WBIL group. We also report these 
as a percentage of GDP and GNI per capita in 2018. Our results 
show that the population-weighted cost per DALY averted for 
UMI countries that reflect health opportunity costs would be 
5,155 USD (US$2018), which represents 55% (57%) of the 
population-weighted GDP (GNI) per capita for UMI countries. 
As shown in the far-right column in Table 1, this value under-
estimates health opportunity costs for just over half of coun-
tries and overestimates for the other nearly half. The 
population-weighted cost per DALY averted for LMI countries 
329 USD (2018 US) represents 15% (15%) of population- 
weighted GDP (GNI) per capita for LMI countries, and the 
estimate of 133 USD (US$2018) for LI countries represents 
18% (20%) of population-weighted GDP (GNI) per capita for 
that these countries. The estimate for LMI countries also 
underestimates health opportunity costs for fewer countries 
(24%) than the estimate for UMI (54%) or LI countries (35%). 
The seemingly down-weighted cost per DALY averted esti-
mate for LMI countries reflects the large proportion (46%) of 
people living in LMI countries residing in India, for which the 
estimated marginal productivity of the healthcare system of 
347 USD (i.e., 17% of GDP per capita) falls below average 
compared to other countries in the LMI WBIL. The estimate 
for HI countries of 54,234 USD underestimates health oppor-
tunity costs for half of HI countries and overestimates for the 
other half. These results imply using factors to convert to 
health opportunity costs in $ per DALY by WBIL for 2018 
based on GDP per capita of 0.18x for LI, 0.15x for LMI, 0.55x 
for UMI, and 1.14x for HI, or 0.2x, 0.15x, 0.57x, and 1.15x for 
GNI per capita for LI, LMI, UMI, and HI countries, respectively.
Figure 1 provides a means to visualize the results of current 
defaults and the suggested population-weighted average 
defaults by WBIL. The x-axis shows the estimated country- 
specific opportunity cost of a 1 USD per capita change in 
health expenditure and the y-axis shows the implied oppor-
tunity cost from applying each default. The 45-degree line 






cost per DALY 
averted (2018 US$)
As a % of population 
weighted average 
GDP per capita
As a % of population 
weighted average 
GNI per capita
# of countries in which 
health opportunity costs 
are underestimated
% of countries in which 
health opportunity costs 
are underestimated
cLow income (LI) 0.6 133 18% 20% 8 35%
Lower middle-income 
(LMI)
2.9 329 15% 15% 8 24%
Upper middle-income 
(UMI)
2.5 5,155 55% 57% 21 54%
High-income (HI) 1.0 54,234 114% 115% 13 50%
Abbreviations: DALY, disability-adjusted life year; WBIL, World Bank income level. 
Figure 1. Performance of defaults in correctly assessing health opportunity costs for each country.
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represents an agreement between these estimates and the 
distance below (above) the line reveals the extent to which 
the default under(over)estimates health opportunity costs.
The figure makes it visually clear that applying a low and 
fixed threshold overestimates health opportunity cost in most 
countries. Similarly, applying 3x GDP per capita will under-
estimate health opportunity costs in all countries and WBILs.
4. Discussion
The continued use of established default values for thresholds 
may substantially and negatively affect national health out-
comes by overvaluing interventions that generate net health 
losses while undervaluing worthy interventions. We sought to 
offer better cross-sectional defaults based on WBIL by extra-
polating from the available evidence. However, using a default 
based on WBIL for countries in the same WBIL suggests that 
some countries will adopt healthcare interventions that would 
generate net health losses, while others would fail to adopt 
healthcare interventions that would generate net health ben-
efits for their populations. This realization should motivate the 
collection of national data for individual countries.
If the application of a default aims to identify healthcare 
interventions likely to represent cost-effective strategies across 
all countries within a WBIL, then setting the threshold at the 
estimate of marginal productivity for the country with the 
lowest estimate of marginal productivity within the group 
would likely better achieve this aim. Using an estimate of 
500 USD or 553 USD in US$2018 for LMI and UMI countries, 
for example, will largely do this for 2018. We emphasize, 
however, that using this strategy to deem an intervention 
cost-ineffective using this threshold for all countries in 
a WBIL would likely mean rejecting an intervention that 
would have generated net benefits in some of the countries 
in the group. Furthermore, as national economies grow (or 
shrink), their budgets for health care will also likely change, 
alongside changes in the burden of disease, fertility rates, 
demographics (e.g., sex and age structure), and other charac-
teristics that will lead the marginal productivity of the health-
care system likely to change. Applying a cost-effectiveness 
threshold in 2018 US$ to judge the cost-effectiveness of esti-
mates of the expected additional costs and benefits of 
a healthcare intervention with a net present value presented 
in 2020 US$ and costs and benefits occurring over future years 
fails to account for any growth in the marginal productivity of 
health care.
In line with previous analyses by Woods et al. (2016), our 
results showed that applying a 1x GDP per capita rule of 
thumb to assess cost-effectiveness results in an underestimate 
of health opportunity costs for most LI and LMI countries, 
suggesting that we should expect that using a 1x GDP per 
capita as a threshold to inform decisions would reduce health 
outcomes overall for most countries. Using 0.5xGDP per 
capita, as suggested more recently [9] more accurately reflects 
health opportunity costs in LI and LMI countries. While this 
lower default results in health opportunity cost overestimation 
or underestimation in about half of the LMI countries, under-
estimation occurs more frequently for LI countries. Thus, 
recommending the adoption of a healthcare intervention 
across LI, LMI, and UMI countries on the basis of a cost per 
DALY averted of 0.5x GDP per capita would likely lead to 
a reduction in overall health outcomes in more LI countries 
than in UMI countries with potential implications for equity.
In HI countries, however, 0.5x GDP (or GNI) per capita 
results in an overestimate of health opportunity costs in all 
countries while 1x GDP results in an overestimate for most. On 
the other hand, 3x GDP (or GNI) per capita results in 
a substantial underestimate of health opportunity costs for 
all HI countries, as reflected in our population-weighted cost 
per DALY averted estimates of 114% (115%) of GDP (GNI) per 
capita. This contrasts with evidence from HI countries from 
analyses of within-country data because within-country esti-
mates of the elasticity of mortality with respect to expenditure 
tend to be higher in magnitude and result in the lower esti-
mated marginal productivity of healthcare expenditure [30]. 
The number of estimates based on within-country data con-
tinues to increase, and now also includes at least one UMI 
country (i.e., South Africa [31]). In addition to obtaining 
national data, the collection and analysis of within-countries 
data related to health opportunity costs should remain 
a research priority.
We find a better reflection of health opportunity costs 
across countries when using defaults that account for the 
relative population sizes of countries in WBIL (i.e., population- 
weighted averages) that avoid issues with averaging ratios 
across WBILs. The population-weighted cost per DALY averted 
estimates by WBIL performs better than any previously used or 
suggested defaults when compared with estimates of health 
opportunity costs. As countries change income levels and 
healthcare spending, and as additional marginal productivity 
of healthcare expenditure estimates become available, we can 
expect the defaults would and should change.
The application of a WBIL default will most likely perform worse 
for countries that move between WBILs over time, including those 
with GNI per capita values that fall close to the thresholds used by 
the World Bank to classify countries. We can expect that countries 
may move between income groups as their economies grow or 
shrink relative to other economies. Accordingly, as this occurs, the 
countries should increase the multiplier for the GDP (or GNI) per 
capita assumed (e.g., from 0.15x to 0.55x for GDP per capita when 
shifting from LMI to UMI). When big countries move between 
WBILs this leads to significant changes in population-weighted 
estimates of the average cost per DALY averted for the WBIL 
(e.g., India moved from LI to LMI in 2009, China moved from LMI 
to UMI in 2012). Looking prospectively, with India accounting for 
nearly half of the population of the LMI group, its relatively low 
existing valuation estimate impacts the WBIL overall (as discussed 
above). With India projected to achieve a significant growth in real 
GDP per capita over the next 20 years that could see it move into 
the UMI [45], the WBIL defaults estimated using the methods we 
suggested may see significant changes. In addition, as countries 
develop and their health expenditure budgets expand, we should 
expect the suggested WBIL threshold values to change over time. 
We suggest that in the absence of a better approach, analysts 
might apply the values in Table 2 to future years by applying the 
percentage of population-weighted average GDP or GNI per capita 
for the income group to the income groups updated population- 
weighted average GDP or GNI per capita in the absence of better 
EXPERT REVIEW OF PHARMACOECONOMICS & OUTCOMES RESEARCH 5
data. We suggest that annually updating the estimates to reflect 
updated data on WBIL, population, economic growth, and new 
national health opportunity costs estimates offers an even better 
option. Annual updating would account for countries moving 
between WBILs and allow for the inclusion of additional country- 
level data about marginal productivity of healthcare expenditure, 
which served as the basis for the estimates. In addition, a process of 
regular updating would provide a motivation and means for eva-
luation of the stability of the estimates. While these methods 
remain imperfect, they account for any growth in the marginal 
productivity of national healthcare systems. Given the non- 
negligible challenges involved in estimating these values, whether 
for a single country using within-country data or across countries 
using cross-country data, the ability of analysts to project health 
opportunity costs based on existing estimates of marginal produc-
tivity offers great value. If or when these become available, they (or, 
better yet, updated estimates for the current year) should also 
inform updated population-weighted averages.
Although the defaults suggested here reflect health oppor-
tunity costs across countries better than previously used or 
suggested defaults, by virtue of being defaults, they will still 
overestimate health opportunity costs in some countries and 
underestimate in others (although to a lesser extent that 
previously used or suggested defaults). For example, Figure 1 
illustrates over- and underestimates assuming a 1 USD spend 
per capita across countries. In reality, the cost of an interven-
tion in each country may not be proportionate to the national 
population. For example, assuming the same per-patient cost 
in each country, an intervention targeted at children will have 
a higher total cost in countries with a relatively larger fraction 
of children in its total population. If countries with relatively 
more children are, in general, poorer and face higher health 
opportunity costs (i.e., reflected by a lower cost per DALY 
averted estimates) relative to other countries, then applying 
the default suggested here would likely underestimate health 
opportunity costs. This means that the potential for greater 
net health losses with negative implications in terms of overall 
population health in poorer countries with a lower life expec-
tancy that already face higher health opportunity costs. 
Concerns about equity should further motivate the collection 
of country-specific estimates and improved monitoring of the 
health and economic implications of interventions as countries 
invest in them over time.
Our assessment of the performance of defaults based on the 
comparison of the estimates from two studies [29,30] depends, 
in part, on econometric analysis that uses cross-country data 
[46]. Econometric analyses of cross-country data assume a single 
model can relate differences in health outcomes to differences 
in expenditure on health care (i.e., the approach presumes the 
ability to estimate an international health production function). 
As discussed, econometric advantages come from performing 
analyses of within-country data, with the additional benefit that 
within-country data support the estimation of country-specific 
health production functions. We recognize our use of historical 
data as a limitation. Future studies should prioritize updating 
estimates using more recent data and forming projections of 
future values. The mechanisms underpinning changes in mar-
ginal productivity remain complex, variable, and uncertain [47]. 
Reflecting on current times, we can anticipate that large macro-
economic impacts (such as the consequences of the COVID-19 
pandemic in early 2020 and associated policy responses) will 
affect the marginal productivity of healthcare expenditure, 
which merits further analysis once data become available.
5. Conclusion
The best option for informing decisions around resource alloca-
tion in health care such that they improve health outcomes 
overall remains the use of country-specific estimates of the 
marginal productivity of the healthcare system where these 
exist. In the absence of existing information for individual coun-
tries, any default applied may result in over- or under-estimation 
of health opportunity costs, although some defaults perform 
worse than others. In particular, 3x GDP or GNI per capita under-
estimates health opportunity costs for all LI, LMI, and UMI coun-
try healthcare systems and nearly all HI country healthcare 
systems, while 1x GDP or GNI per capita underestimates health 
opportunity costs for the vast majority of healthcare systems in 
UMI and LMI countries and all LI country healthcare systems. 
When analysts use aggregate default values, for example, when 
evaluating an intervention at the country group level and/or to 
support policies and decisions at an aggregate level, this paper 
suggests defaults that better reflect health opportunity costs 
across countries within each WBIL than previously used or 
recommended. We suggest that health economists can use 
these defaults to inform decisions in 2018 or 2019, but that 
these defaults can and should be updated in future years.
Notes
1. Formerly GNP, see terminology change in 1993 [48].
2. This gives a different answer than simply calculating a population- 
weighted average cost per DALY averted for the WBIL group. Our 
approach to obtaining a central estimate for each WBIL group 
accurately reflects the variability that occurs in the denominator 
of ratios (i.e., the age-old problem of needing to calculate the ratio 
of the averages rather than to calculate the average ratio for HEAs).
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